Seeing as there was a 5G tower emitter 2.1kms upwind of the upwind threshold at Ahmedabad, it may well have been an induced LRRA minus error (per the Turkish 737 at Schiphol) that told the TCMA that it was on the ground at excessive thrust (= simultaneous shutdown of both engines). However, the LGEU's six WOW switches would had to have been in oleo-extension hiatus momentarily (due to the gear tilt pause) for this to occur on AI 171... as it rose into the Line of Sight of that 5G tower. John Sampson
Or more precisely, it's unlikely to have been an inappropriate action by the low-time 2nd officer (the inference by Jon Ostrow in The Air Current article, but most likely per this extension of the Boeing waiver application (link below):
:
Another means of dual actuation of fuel cut-off switches:
This link is to a 7 page Boeing "pleading" to the FAA for a TCMA/FADEC flaw(‘s) interim waiver (dispensations under the two “part 25” safety regulations). Petitioner Boeing asks for NO publication and no solicitation of public or industry comment. But... you only got two engines and it's admittedly a potential common single-point software failure. That is patently clear.
By design, the TCMA is capable of shutting down both engines if it thinks that it’s on the ground and that thrust being produced is incompatible with the throttle position (TLA).
Think 5G, the RADALT (LRRA)'s and the LGEU WoW ground/air sensing's six micro-switches. M/switches and LRRA inputs decide the a/c's Ground/Air status. A tilted main-gear trucks' pause (for door-opening) may not promptly achieve oleo extension to actuate the WoW m/switches to AIR mode .. and there was also a powerful 5G tower 2.1 kms upwind of the departure threshold.
Think of a 5G LRRA pulse from that 5G tower antenna as Flt AI 171 broke ground and rose above the Line-of-Sight horizon. The timing of a double flame-out is then “spot on”. Throttle lever angle TLA) may be one of the TCMA/FADEC flaws (plural) referred to obliquely in the (above) Boeing waiver application? We know that the Turkish 737 crash short of Schiphol was attributable to a RADALT not "failing SAFE"... but actively showing minus 8 feet during early finals (in flare/retard territory, and thus dictating the auto-throttles go back to idle). The effect of various 5G spectrums on LRRA RADALTS is well historied. The Boeing software gurus involved in TCMA/FADEC do not disagree with this TCMA/FADEC known flaw interaction as a likely cause (on Pprune.org). That should be a “heads-up” for the Indian Investigators.
Seeing as there was a 5G tower emitter 2.1kms upwind of the upwind threshold at Ahmedabad, it may well have been an induced LRRA minus error (per the Turkish 737 at Schiphol) that told the TCMA that it was on the ground at excessive thrust (= simultaneous shutdown of both engines). However, the LGEU's six WOW switches would had to have been in oleo-extension hiatus momentarily (due to the gear tilt pause) for this to occur on AI 171... as it rose into the Line of Sight of that 5G tower. John Sampson
Definitely, I put an article out on the 16th on the actors that could do this https://open.substack.com/pub/mauler/p/the-great-cannon-connection-how-chinese?
Or more precisely, it's unlikely to have been an inappropriate action by the low-time 2nd officer (the inference by Jon Ostrow in The Air Current article, but most likely per this extension of the Boeing waiver application (link below):
:
Another means of dual actuation of fuel cut-off switches:
https://downloads.regulations.gov/FAA-2016-7855-0005/attachment_1.pdf
This link is to a 7 page Boeing "pleading" to the FAA for a TCMA/FADEC flaw(‘s) interim waiver (dispensations under the two “part 25” safety regulations). Petitioner Boeing asks for NO publication and no solicitation of public or industry comment. But... you only got two engines and it's admittedly a potential common single-point software failure. That is patently clear.
By design, the TCMA is capable of shutting down both engines if it thinks that it’s on the ground and that thrust being produced is incompatible with the throttle position (TLA).
Think 5G, the RADALT (LRRA)'s and the LGEU WoW ground/air sensing's six micro-switches. M/switches and LRRA inputs decide the a/c's Ground/Air status. A tilted main-gear trucks' pause (for door-opening) may not promptly achieve oleo extension to actuate the WoW m/switches to AIR mode .. and there was also a powerful 5G tower 2.1 kms upwind of the departure threshold.
Think of a 5G LRRA pulse from that 5G tower antenna as Flt AI 171 broke ground and rose above the Line-of-Sight horizon. The timing of a double flame-out is then “spot on”. Throttle lever angle TLA) may be one of the TCMA/FADEC flaws (plural) referred to obliquely in the (above) Boeing waiver application? We know that the Turkish 737 crash short of Schiphol was attributable to a RADALT not "failing SAFE"... but actively showing minus 8 feet during early finals (in flare/retard territory, and thus dictating the auto-throttles go back to idle). The effect of various 5G spectrums on LRRA RADALTS is well historied. The Boeing software gurus involved in TCMA/FADEC do not disagree with this TCMA/FADEC known flaw interaction as a likely cause (on Pprune.org). That should be a “heads-up” for the Indian Investigators.